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Exhuming Trends in Ethnic Conflict 




The world-wide surge in the number and violence of open conflicts revolving 
around ethnic or religious identities towards the end of the 20th century is a 
powerful reminder that communal identities are not a remnant of the past but 
a potent force in contemporary politics. After three decades of independence, 
ethnicity is more central than ever to the political process of many African 
countries. Africa has had more than its fair share of ethnic dissent which has 
sometimes plummeted states into civil war as was experienced in Nigeria, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and reached frightening 
proportions in Rwanda and now Sudan. Political openings and multiparty 
elections have led to the formation of innumerable overtly or covertly ethnic 
political parties, which serve more often to increase civil strife of which the 
most recent addition to the long list in Africa is Kenya.
Africa’s ethnic disturbances have occurred more within national borders, 
thus giving rise to unstable domestic systems. This paper attempts to address 
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these ethnic issues by assessing certain conflict spots as opposed to areas of 
relative calm in Africa. The assessment of states on both sides of the divide 
(i.e. cooperation and conflict) is done in the hope that trends that lead to 
conflict as well as those that lead to cooperation can be identified. In order 
to establish these patterns of cooperation and conflict, it became pertinent 
to use a broad range of case studies, notably, Tanzania, Botswana, South 
Africa, Uganda and Côte d’Ivoire. The result of this study tells that the 
lack or presence of equity and justice (components of good governance), 
high literacy levels and an external threat, are factors which strengthen or 
diminish possibilities of ethnic conflict.
Introduction
From Thucydides to the Christian Fathers, David Hume and to the present 
day, man has tried to explain why men fight. In all these, there is no single 
unified theory capable of explaining why men fight. Thus the thrust of 
William James’ argument – that men should be looking for causes of peace 
instead of causes of war, could not have been better imagined. This thrust 
serves as motivation for this study.
Scholars in the past two decades have occupied themselves with finding the 
causes of this drift with a bid to understand them and proffer solutions. 
Quaker-Dokubo (2001), for instance, attributes this trend in Africa to the 
gross neglect of her cultural basis. There is a negation of ethnic, regional 
and cultural diversities rather than their recognition as building blocks 
in the construction of a civil society. There is an arrogance of intellectual 
paradigms, such as Modernisation, Dependency and Neo-Marxist theories, 
that often relegates ethnicity to the realm of false consciousness or considers 
it the unfortunate remnants of a pre-modern Africa. So too, using Nigeria as 
case study, scholars like Nnoli (1978) contend that ethnicity in post-colonial 
Africa is largely due to the way and manner their politics evolved.
One thing remains certain, however, while positions and solutions vary, the 
problem of rising ethnic conflicts remains and worsens by the day, so that, 
as noted by Marshall (2008), ‘there are currently about 15 million displaced, 
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mainly internally displaced’ persons and ‘about 3.5 million transnational 
refugees’. The relatively recent sharp increases in these numbers have 
increased the continent’s humanitarian plight. The result, as noted by Ibaba 
(2006:2), has been a negative impact on the economy and society through 
undermining the development of local economies and thereby exacerbating 
poverty.
Understanding ethnic groupings and ethnic conflicts
Defining ethnic groups is quite a difficult task. To some, it refers to a 
subjective perception of common origins, historical memories, ties and 
aspirations. Quaker-Dokubo (2001:44) explains: ‘Ethnic group pertains 
to organized activities by persons linked by a consciousness of a special 
identity, who jointly seek to maximize their corporate political, economic 
and social interest.’ Heeger (in Willigenburg 1995:13) refers to ethnic groups 
as ‘cultural nations which are bound together in the first place by a common 
culture and which lack the internationally recognized organization of a 
sovereign state.’
Gurr (1993:17) classifies ethnic affiliations into three, namely: ‘Ethno-
Nationals, Indigenous Peoples and Communal Contenders.’
Ethno-Nationals are historically autonomous, and often large and regionally 
concentrated groups that are committed to achieving or regaining 
independent statehood. Examples here include Eritreans and East Timorese 
formerly under Ethiopia and Indonesia respectively, the Kurds in Iraq and 
Western Saharans under Morocco.
Indigenous peoples are politically conquered, culturally isolated, ecologically 
endangered and economically vulnerable descendants of the original 
inhabitants of a region. The Khoi-San (bushmen) of South Africa, Botswana 
and Namibia are examples of indigenous peoples.
Communal Contenders are culturally distinct groups in heterogeneous 
societies in which no single group constitutes a demographic majority of 
the population. In societies dominated by communal contenders, there is a 
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general acceptance of the moral equivalence of all groups. Political power at 
the centre is based on fluid or unstable inter-ethnic coalitions. Most African 
countries including Nigeria are dominated by communal contenders.
If, as Mthethwa-Sommers (in Nnoli 1998:417) observes, ‘ethnic conflicts 
in Africa are an everyday occurrence’, it becomes necessary to understand 
the term ‘ethnic conflict’. Peterson and others (1982:1) posit that the word 
‘ethnic’ is derived via Latin from the Greek ethnos which means nation or 
race. Leith and Solomon (2001:32) affirm further that ‘various definitions 
of ethnicity build upon this by adding the idea of a common denominator, 
so to speak, that underlies this conception’.
Thomson (2000:58) defines an ethnic group as ‘a community of people who 
have the conviction that they have a common identity and common fate 
based on issues of origin, kinship, ties, traditions, cultural uniqueness, a 
shared history and possibly a shared language …. Ethnicity becomes more 
pronounced when it is used to distinguish one social group from another 
within a specific territory’. He posits further, ‘all individuals have ethnic 
allegiances irrespective of whether they are from the minority of a state’s 
population or the majority, with the result that ethnicity as a sentiment is 
expressed by both majority and minority populations. Obviously, this social 
pluralism will lead to differences of interests, and this is where the possibility 
of ethnic conflict starts to emerge’. 
Our analysis of trends in ethnic conflicts in Africa will thus revolve around 
the fact that most African states are largely heterogeneous states comprised 
of communal contenders, with each group seeking power, control and 
importance over the other.
Theories of ethnic conflict
In Africa we have witnessed naked ethnic wars and backsliding democracies 
in many places such as the Western Darfur Region, Somalia, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, just to name a few. Hence 
Smith (1992:436) submits that ‘in most recent times Africa has become 
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the hot bed of ethnic conflicts and movements over the last three decades. 
Many states are wrecked by ethnic dissension’ In the words of Nobert Gabiro 
(2006:1): ‘Among the most significant and growing challenges to peace, 
freedom, democratic governance and the rule of law in Africa are ethnic, 
racial, communal and religious intolerance and conflicts’. These no doubt 
lead to flagrant abuses of fundamental human rights and freedoms, and to 
crime, violence, apathy and environmental irresponsibility. But when or 
how did ethnicity get to be an integral part of African politics? 
Within the context of neo-colonial statehood, ethnicity is a colonial 
derivative based on matriarchal or patriarchal relations forged in the distant 
past and used by an ethnic group as a defensive or offensive weapon against 
other groups. The colonialists posit that they ‘tried to make a nation-state 
out of a hotch-potch of antagonistic and uncivilized African peoples but 
failed in their pious mission. The various tribes had age-long hatred for one 
another and as soon as the colonial power went, the natives descended into 
barbarism, maiming and killing each other’ (Avugma 2000:1).
The Nationalists, on the other hand, see things differently as they paint 
idyllic pictures of the African past and blame all tribal conflicts that have 
erupted after independence solely on the colonialists. This viewpoint is as 
historically incorrect as it is undialectical. A less extreme position is taken 
by Bailey (1994:4) when he posits that ‘the political map of Africa is a 
western colonial creation, drawn by western powers with little regard to the 
boundaries of historic ethnic homelands or the ethnic compositions of the 
subject population, and today these artificial or multi-ethnic nations lack 
the internal political cohesion necessary for survival as nations’.
Facts abound on how the internal evolution of some African communities 
before colonialism had provided groups of people the opportunity to 
appropriate the labour of others and subjugate other communities. This 
scenario definitely generated ethnic animosity and discrimination. It 
was these differences that were carefully and deliberately nurtured by the 
colonialists and later exploited by the local political bourgeoisie. Supporting 
this claim, Nnoli (1998) points out that a contributory factor that has made 
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ethnic conflicts more severe in Africa than in other parts of the world is the 
incursion and exploitation by the colonialists which compounded already 
strained inter-ethnic relations. In countries like Nigeria, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Kenya and Zimbabwe, colonial powers utilised the segmentation of ethnic 
groups to their advantage. There is no denying that since the colonial era, 
African states have frequently been hampered by instability, corruption and 
ethnic violence. Great instability has mainly been the result of marginalisation 
of other ethnic groups. Many politicians have used their positions of power 
to ignite negative sentiments arising from such marginalisation. While 
affirming the position of Nnoli above, Suberu (2003) also contends that 
ethnic conflict arises from the discontent of groups toward the perceived 
domination by other groups who are unduly favoured by the government.
The globalisation theory contends that the upsurge of ethnic conflicts in 
Africa in the 1980s and 1990s was a reaction to events in East Europe. The 
collapse of the old order in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
had a tremendous impact on the fragile nation states of Africa. Some of them 
have reacted, in the words of Bekker (1993:81), ‘by increasingly articulating 
similar demands for human and cultural rights and for equity in access to 
resources’. 
The hegemony theory of conflict argues that ethnic conflicts have been on the 
increase with the era of rapid democratisation of African status. This position 
holds that one-party (hegemonic) states have better control of ethnic conflict. 
As Rothchild (in Nkwi 2001:5) points out: ‘In such hegemonic situations, the 
state uses its coercive power to freeze inter-ethnic conflicts…. Hegemonic 
strategies of conflict management include subjugation, avoidance, isolation, 
assimilation and displacement, all of which tend to display relatively low 
levels of political interaction and reciprocity’.
I actually started this study with a bias for this theory as the most effective 
means for the control of ethnic conflicts. But a close study of politics in 
Côte d’Ivoire, the former Soviet Union, the DRC and a host of others, as 
well as reports from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (1993) that China 
had disintegrated along regional lines after Mao’s death, certainly gave cause 
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for a rethink. In my study, it became apparent that the flaw of this theory is 
that every hegemony ends. The end of every hegemony often brings chaos 
as different persons or groups try to fill the vacuum created or acquire 
the authority once possessed by the hegemony. A picture of Côte d’Ivoire 
after Boigny’s hegemony makes one uncomfortable about the prospects of 
relatively prosperous one-party states such as Libya and Egypt with dominant 
dictators in Muammar al-Gaddafi and Hosni Mubarak respectively. 
Ethnic conflict in Africa: Selected cases
Uganda
Independence in 1962 ended a period of colonisation that began in 1885. 
Through the period of colonisation and at independence, there was little 
indication that the country was headed for social and political upheaval. 
Uganda appeared to be a model of stability and progress. During colonisation, 
the British established their authority in Uganda and kept the peace among 
the Nilotic and Bantu groups by negotiations and the application of force 
where necessary. The British had even devised a timetable for withdrawal 
before local groups organised nationalist movements, which were 
unfortunately separated by ethnic and religious lines as well as historical 
enmities and rivalries (Buganda, Banyoro and Acholi peoples). This state 
of affairs was further worsened by the struggle between Milton Obote, a 
Lango leader elected prime minister in 1962 and Mutesa, the Buganda King 
(Kabaka) elected president in 1963 who sought autonomy for his people. In 
1966, Obote sacked the Kabaka, thereby ending Buganda’s autonomy, and 
forced the Kabaka to flee the country. In 1971, Obote was overthrown by Idi 
Amin who had good relations with the Buganda and thus pursued retribution 
against the Lango and Acholi groups. From 1963 to 1981, Ugandan politics 
was plagued by ethnicity and thus progress made under colonial rule was 
stunted or lost entirely. 
Several African states, such as Nigeria, possess a similar history of elites 
fostering ethnic reprisals and plunging the country into ethnic chaos. This 
scenario of elite competition causing ethnic conflict is aptly expressed by 
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Kruger (1993:11) when he states: ‘ethnicity and nationalism … are the 
creations of elites who draw upon, distort and sometimes fabricate materials 
from the cultures of the groups they wish to represent in order to protect 
their well-being or existence or to gain political and economic advantage 
for their groups as well as for themselves’. Today, though still noticeable, 
ethnicity is not central to Ugandan politics as the country has had to cope 
with conflicts with its neighbours Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC on a 
regular basis. One of such conflicts, as noted by Kristine Drake (2006), is the 
Ituri conflict in the northeastern corner of the DRC which involves the DRC, 
Rwanda and Uganda.
It should be noted that ethnic loyalty in politics as well as the existence of 
a political divide, set the stage for an unstable Uganda. Unity across ethnic 
divisions has only been temporarily achieved due to the external threat or 
problems (coping with refugees) presented by her unstable neighbours.
South Africa 
South Africa has a multiracial and multiethnic population. Blacks constitute 
77% of which the Zulu make up 22.4% of the overall population. Whites 
account for 11%, Coloured people for 9% and Asians (mainly Indians) 
2%. The largest concentration of Asians and Coloured people is found in 
KwaZulu-Natal and the three Cape provinces.
The liberation struggle during the years of white minority rule cemented 
the Blacks, Asians and Coloured people together. With the end of apartheid, 
however, most Asians and Coloured people, conscious of their minority 
position turned to vote for the ruling National Party along with most whites. 
Blacks gave overwhelming support to the African National Congress (ANC) 
except in KwaZulu-Natal, where the ethnically based Inkatha Freedom 
Party won more than half the Zulu votes. The violent incidents following 
immediately (1994) were not between blacks and whites, but between the 
Zulu who supported the ANC and those who supported Inkatha led by 
Buthelezi. This becomes a classic case of intra-communal conflict spurred 
by elite competition (cf Kruger 1993).
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It should be noticed here that as in Uganda where ethnic dissent was kept at 
bay in the pre-independence era due to the presence of the white colonial 
masters, South Africa tells the same story. The unity forged by the Blacks, 
Asians and Coloured people under white oppression collapsed when state 
power was to be competed for by all groups. The Asians and Coloured people 
inadvertently became suspicious of the Blacks and felt unsafe coming under 
Black rule. On the other hand, this quest for state power (by groups/elites) 
coupled with the absence of an overarching or common enemy, set South 
African blacks against each other.
These two examples raise a serious question. Must there always be the 
presence of the aggressive/dominant other, before ethnic groups within 
African states can forget their differences and work together? In most 
African states where the fight for independence was intense, most ethnic 
groups worked together to secure independence. But with independence 
secured, the quest for state power and a mutual suspicion between these 
same groups arose, thus leading to the disintegration of the unity forged. 
This pattern applies to many ethnic conflict situations in Africa.
Côte d’Ivoire 
The population of Côte d’Ivoire is diverse, comprising more than 60 
ethnic groups. The country enjoyed political stability and great economic 
growth during the 1960s and 70s despite occasional challenges by students 
and members of the armed forces to the generally conservative, business 
oriented outlook of Houphouet-Boigny. Sommerville (2006) notes that 
in 1990, President Felix Houphouet-Boigny extended his thirty-year rule 
through the ballot box. He died in office in 1993. What also died with 
him was his iron grip over politics and his conscious efforts to balance the 
appointment of senior ministers to avoid a build up of ethnic, regional and 
religious tensions among a diverse population. Felix Houphouet-Boigny 
had succeeded in keeping a lid on these divisive factors. His successors, 
lacking the respect or fear accorded him by Ivorians, used these divisive 
factors to establish their power. Today, one of West Africa’s most promising 
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and peaceful states is struggling to recover from an ethnic conflict that tore 
it apart and laid it in ruins.
Houphouet-Boigny’s overarching authority coupled with a blossoming 
economy and common sense diplomacy which ensured that most (if not all) 
groups were adequately represented in government, elicited respect from his 
people. This established ethnic cohesion during his thirty three years at the 
helm of affairs. However, as has been observed, the danger here is, when 
such overarching authority leaves the scene, chaos reigns as some groups, 
distrusting the new regime, try to break away, while others get ambitious 
to want to fill this vacuum. The violence that took over Eastern Europe 
with the collapse of the former Soviet Union, and Iraq with the expulsion 
of Saddam Hussein, are good cases in point. And with regard to countries 
like Libya, Egypt and Cuba, it is an open-ended guess what will happen 
when their charismatic or larger than life dictators quit the stage before they 
can prepare their people for proper democratic transitions or groom an 
acceptable successor. Cuba so far seems to have succeeded in this with the 
handover of power by Fidel Castro to his brother Raul Castro.
While this research tries to identify existing trends in the above treated cases 
of states ridden with ethnic conflict, attention will be focused at this point 
on African states that have been seemingly peaceful to see if in them, we can 
find the key to peaceful ethnic co-existence. 
Botswana
Since independence in 1966, Botswana has had a flourishing multiparty 
democracy. Each of the elections since independence has been free and fair. 
The country’s minorities participate freely in the political process. Botswana 
is a country rich in diamonds and cattle and it possesses a population of just 
1.6 million. But as an ethnic minority, the San experience both poverty and 
allegedly discrimination. The San have pressed for better standards of living 
but have never been violent as they acknowledge both the government’s efforts 
to improve their lot as well as the factors militating against them. For example, 
the IRIN report (2004:1) on the ‘San’ Bushmen states: ‘The government of 
Botswana provides free education but the San have problems accessing it. 
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Teaching is done in Tswana and English, which many San children do not 
speak.’ Under the Remote Area Dwellers (R.A.D.) programme, of which the 
San are a majority, the government has made many accomplishments. It 
has based the programme’s assistance on the distance of a people or group 
from existing social services, as well as on economic marginalisation, rather 
than on ethnicity. This has enabled the government to reach settlements in 
the most distant parts, bringing in roads, potable water, primary schools, 
hostels and health posts. All these have been possible due to the fact that the 
government has stuck – or at least tried to stick – to its principle of non-
differentiation and non-discrimination which it adopted at independence 
in 1966. Several studies have observed that the Tswana make up over 50% of 
Botswana population and most of the remaining peoples have been heavily 
absorbed into the Tswana culture. This may be one of the main reasons for 
Botswana’s cultural and social stability over the last two centuries.
It is my position here that in its policy of inclusion, the Botswana government 
has endeavoured to carry all peoples along, thus dousing the need for any 
group to want to project its interests above those of others. The December 
12th 2006 court ruling which gave the San Bushmen (about 1,000 in 
number) the right to remain on their land instead of being moved to enable 
diamond mining, attests to this. In respecting this court order the Botswana 
government showed that despite the meagre population of the San Bushmen, 
which accounts for less than 0.1 per cent of the entire population, they had 
every right to the good things of life and the preservation of their ancestry. 
Only very few African countries can boast of such respect for minorities 
within their borders. In observing the aforementioned court ruling, the 
Botswana government thus repudiates the notion of Tolanda (1993:1) that: 
the state has always been at the risk of promoting and maintaining 
the degradation of the social environment because of the propensity 
of federal policy making to focus on self-sustenance at the expense of 
those groups and individuals that are deemed peripheral to the state…. 
Studies of statehood have shown us that…policies and expectations that 
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serve the interests of all ethnic groups, irrespective of their differences, 
has not yet been fully realized.
Within the context of such transparency and respect for group rights, 
Botswana’s flourishing democracy sets the standard and serves as an example 
for most African states.
Tanzania
If poor economic performance is believed to be one of the causes of ethnic 
unrest, then the case of Tanzania is bound to nullify this claim. From the 
beginning, Tanzania was a poor state with few minerals suitable for export, 
little industry, and an agricultural system dominated by ideas of local self- 
sufficiency. Though since the mid 1990s, Tanzania’s economy has performed 
fairly well, it still remains one of the world’s poorest countries. So, what spell 
has kept Tanzania’s over 120 ethnic groups from tearing at each other in the 
midst of very scarce resources and in their quest for domination and control 
– as has been witnessed in most multi-ethnic states in Africa? 
Other than an anti-colonial rebellion in 1905 known as the Maji Maji revolt, 
Tanganyika was fairly quiet. It became independent in December 1961. The 
appeal of the major party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), 
led by Julius Nyerere, cut across ethnic and national lines. Thus Nyerere 
became Tanganyika’s first president, and later Tanzania (after Tanganyika’s 
amalgamation with Zanzibar) served as an adhesive for the people. This 
factor, coupled with the level of literacy facilitated by the Tanzanian 
government, has helped maintain ethnic cooperation within the polity. The 
country boasts of a 90% literacy rate.
Though economic policies such as Ujaama operated by Nyerere failed largely 
due to external factors (the increase in world oil prices) and the corruption 
of the middle men and local chiefs, the transparency of his government 
and the will for progress (as exhibited by other reform policies) assured his 
legitimacy standing. An illiterate populace most likely would have found it 
difficult keeping the peace in the face of such policy failures, a factor most 
political opponents would have taken advantage of to spur the ‘illiterate’ 
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people to violent protests which would most likely have degenerated into 
ethnic conflict. 
Analysis of trends
In the cases treated, I believe patterns can be deduced such that, irrespective 
of the peculiarity of any case of ethnic conflict, each case could be analysed 
against the backdrop of such trends.
Some of the cases treated bring to mind the story of two feuding brothers, 
who on sighting a wild beast, set aside their grievances and joined forces to 
battle for their lives, but resumed their feuding as soon as the beast was killed. 
The period of colonial rule saw all of Africa in solidarity for one another. 
There was a common enemy and African brotherhood was needed to defeat 
it. Now that the enemy is gone, with no common goal to unite them, the 
brotherhood is broken and survival of the fittest takes precedence. From the 
volatile cases in Rwanda, Burundi and now Sudan to the less violent ethnic 
tension in Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal, this trend applies. Reduction of ethnic 
hostilities in Uganda has been mainly because of perceived threats from her 
neighbours. Need there always be an external threat or fear of reprisal from 
an overbearing force for ethnic groups to sheath swords and work together? 
Ensuring the existence of an external threat to maintain internal peace or 
cooperation among groups is certainly no solution as the external threat may 
one day act out its anticipated aggression and thus exacerbate local tension 
into a cross-border or regional one. Certainly, suspicion of one group against 
the other has been the bedrock of ethnic conflicts, so the problem remains: 
How best can suspicion be curbed?
Taking a close look at cases treated here, we can deduce the following 
trends.
There is seldom any country in the world today where the economy is 
good, the literacy level is high and the government desirous of progress that 
experiences violent ethnic upheavals. Using Botswana as a starting point 





contrary to land needed for the rearing of livestock which is the mainstay 
of the Tswana majority, since social affluence is still largely determined 
by the number of cattle owned. Rather than disregard the San who are an 
almost insignificant minority, the government has strived to maintain a 
balance between both cultures. The government has been able to achieve 
public awareness of its efforts through its commitment to literacy. This is 
not surprising when ‘primary school enrolment is around 98/99% for boys/
girls, and secondary school enrolment is around 61/68%. Literacy is 74/80% 
for men/women’ (Pearson Education 2006:2). The same applies to Tanzania 
where, despite a poor economy, violent confrontations among ethnic groups 
have been kept at the barest minimum. Tanzania has laid great emphasis on 
education since independence and has invested considerable resources in 
providing services for adults as well as children. As a result, the country has 
one of the highest literacy rates in the developing world, around 90%, which 
is almost on a par with that of the United States.
The presence or absence of visionary and charismatic leaders, greatly affects 
the escalation or erosion of ethnic conflict. Unfortunately, African states 
south of the Sahara can boast of just a few such leaders, and this I believe is 
largely responsible for the high number of ethnic conflicts in sub-Saharan 
Africa as opposed to North Africa. Côte d’Ivoire’s history during and after 
Felix Houphouet-Boigny is a tale of both sides of the coin. It can also be 
argued here that the one-party structure of most North African states and 
states south of the equator helped their leaders keep a lid on divisive factors, 
ethnicity inclusive. Bearing in mind the observation of Quaker-Dokubo 
that most African states are made up of communal contenders, having just 
one party with which all members of the political community identify, the 
presence of a firm and respected leader within such a party helps cement 
differences. This also accounts for the rarity of ethnic upheavals and military 
coups in these states, unlike states such as Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Rwanda and Burundi where ethnic tensions climaxed into military coups. As 
noted by Ali Mazrui (in Raph Uwechue 1991:244), ‘A remarkable fact about 
the distribution of military coups in post colonial Africa is that they are 
overwhelmingly north of the equator …. One relevant factor would bring 
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us back to the single party hypothesis.’ If recent happenings in Kenya are 
anything to go by, ethnic tensions are now at their worst under the present 
rule of democracy compared to the relatively stable era of dictatorship and 
the one-party system under Daniel arap Moi. This argument is still plausible 
when cordial ethnic relations are considered in Zambia under Kenneth 
Kaunda, Julius Nyerere’s Tanzania, Muammar Ghaddafi’s Libya, Hosni 
Mubarak’s Egypt, Leopold Senghor and Abdou Diouf ’s Senegal.
Also, experiences in Ghana, Tanzania and Botswana have shown that fair and 
peaceful democratic transitions have aided ethnic cooperation. Once again, 
experiences in Kenya as well as events that led to Nigeria’s civil war among 
others tell how improper and violent elections/transitions can exacerbate 
ethnic crises. Ali Mazrui (1991:244) once again observes:
Countries like Botswana, Mauritius, Lesotho and Swaziland have 
been more open societies in the liberal sense than have most others in 
Africa. Mauritius has even shown the ability to defeat an incumbent 
government at the polls – and have it hand over power peacefully to 
a successor regime. Such political culture is less ‘conflict’ prone than 
average on the continent. 
Ghana has also been a beneficiary of this. Rwanda, with the end of the 
genocidal killings on 4th July 1994, has made great strides with political parties 
cutting across ethnic divides. Rwanda today is showing signs of development 
with peaceful elections held in 2003 along with the adoption by referendum 
of a new constitution that forbids any political activity or discrimination 
based on race, ethnicity (with emphasis on Hutu/Tutsi identity) or religion. 
A World Bank 2006 report (cf Atojoko 2008:99) rated government’s 
effectiveness in Rwanda at 39.8%, which is twice that of Nigeria’s 16.6%, 
her political stability at 27.4%, eight times better than Nigeria’s 3.8%, her 
anticorruption at 55.8% as compared to Nigeria’s 5.8% and her observance 
of the rule of law four times higher (34.3%) than Nigeria’s (8.1%). Bearing in 
mind that Rwanda emerged from a civil war boasting one of Africa’s worst 
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cases of genocide just a little over a decade ago, the gains of peaceful and fair 
elections cannot be better imagined or estimated.
But peaceful elections do not appear from nowhere. They are worked at. 
Throughout history, leaders have spurred their people to achieve the almost 
impossible and our time is no different. As observed by Offe (in Morgan 
2002:3-4), ‘Progress toward a unity of intention and action will materialize 
only when national publics are presented with convincing grounds for 
political integration’. Siedentop reaffirms this position when he says ‘it is the 
duty of a democratic political class to give a lead’ (Siedentop 2000:218).
Conclusion
Bassey and Oshita (2007) opine that ethnic conflicts are not a new 
phenomenon. They have been for as long as states have been in existence. 
This study was therefore conducted with the belief that since ethnic conflicts 
are not new, so also are their causes. And if these causes can be generally 
identified, then a reduction in ethnic conflicts can be achieved if these causes 
are avoided. 
So far, the examination of selected states done herein reveals that countries 
with high levels of literacy suffer little or none of such conflicts as opposed 
to countries with low literacy levels. Secondly, firm, fair and progressive 
leadership, which are pre-requisites for stable multiparty democracies, 
have been shown to foster ethnic cooperation. So far, Paul Kagame’s 
transformation of Rwanda is but a clear example of how such leadership 
can shift a society from bitter resentment to effective cooperation.
It is generally held that had the botched 1994 elections in Nigeria, which were 
considered her freest and fairest, been allowed to prevail, ethnic dissent in the 
country would have been a thing of the past, most especially if the perceived 
winner (Moshood Abiola) had endeavoured to be fair to all groups within 
the country. African scholars agree that smooth transitions in South Africa, 
Ghana and Senegal have helped the stability in these states. Fair elections 
therefore, are a third factor that helps in curbing ethnic conflicts.
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Rwanda and Burundi arguably pose Africa’s worst case scenarios of ethnic 
discord planted by colonialism. If Rwanda, after the most gruesome of 
happenings, can work to curb ethnic discord within its borders, then the rest 
of Africa really has no excuse after almost half a century of independence. 
Colonialism ought not to be blamed for Burundi’s refusal to emulate present 
day Rwanda or for the refusal of ethnic groups in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo to sheath their machetes. Nor should neo-colonialism be 
accused of being responsible for the desire of most African governments to 
stay corrupt and partisan, thereby intensifying suspicion and tension among 
their people. 
Africa should look inward to find the causes of ethnic tension rather than 
blame colonialists who left fifty years ago. This study, while not pretending 
to have all the answers, has taken these steps of inward examination. It is 
therefore my summation that, while establishing that the presence of the 
above variables leads to ethnic cooperation and communality, lacking them 
leads to ethnic discord and violence. Achieving or lacking these tenets is an 
internal issue.
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